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- Title
POLICY BOARDS AND POLICY SMOOTHING.
- Authors
Waller, Christopher J.
- Abstract
Partisan politics and random election outcomes generate policy uncertainty and partisan business cycles. To reduce policy uncertainty, society must design the policy-making environment to overcome electoral uncertainty and partisanship. I show that delegating policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers will produce substantial policy smoothing and lower policy uncertainty relative to a simple model in which elected officials set policy. Board members are chosen in a partisan, noncooperative environment; yet in the benchmark model, policy variability is eliminated, and the cooperative bargaining solution is replicated.
- Subjects
PARTISANSHIP; POLITICAL participation; PUBLIC officers; BUSINESS cycles; SOCIAL participation; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000, Vol 115, Issue 1, p305
- ISSN
0033-5533
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1162/003355300554665