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- Title
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.
- Authors
Way, Jonathan
- Abstract
Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that reasons are premises of good reasoning - that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning towards φ-ing. However, while this reasoning view is indeed attractive, it faces a problem accommodating outweighed reasons. In this article, I argue that the standard solution to this problem is unsuccessful and propose an alternative, which draws on the idea that good patterns of reasoning can be defeasible. I conclude by drawing out implications for the debate over pragmatic reasons for belief and other attitudes and for one influential form of reductionism about the normative.
- Subjects
NORMATIVE theory (Communication); REASON; REASONING; BELIEF &; doubt; INTENTION (Logic)
- Publication
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2017, Vol 98, Issue 2, p251
- ISSN
0279-0750
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/papq.12135