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- Title
Equity‐efficiency tradeoffs in international bargaining.
- Authors
Bagh, Adib; Ederington, Josh
- Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare impact of expanding the negotiation agenda of an international agreement between asymmetric countries (e.g., including specific negotiations over environmental regulations or labor standards in a conventional trade agreement) and demonstrates why such proposed expansions are contentious. A main result is that agenda expansions that provide more bargaining flexibility will increase the efficiency of the agreement but can result in a less equitable agreement that hurts the country that is at a bargaining disadvantage. Similarly, we demonstrate that decreases in bargaining game asymmetry can also make the disadvantaged country worse‐off even as it increases global welfare.
- Subjects
NEGOTIATION; TREATIES; BARGAINING power; ENVIRONMENTAL regulations; PRODUCTION standards
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2024, Vol 62, Issue 2, p782
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.13201