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- Title
GET OUT THE (COSTLY) VOTE: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN FOR GREATER PARTICIPATION.
- Authors
Gerardi, Dino; McConnell, Margaret A.; Romero, Julian; Yariv, Leeat
- Abstract
We examine two commonly discussed institutions inducing turnout: abstention penalties (used in 32 countries) and lotteries rewarding one randomly chosen participant (as proposed on the 2006 Arizona ballot). We analyze a benchmark model in which voters vary in their information quality and participation is costly. We illustrate that both institutions can improve collective outcomes, though lotteries are a more effective instrument asymptotically. Experimentally, we provide strong evidence for selective participation: lab voters participate more when better informed or when institutionally induced. Lotteries fare better than fines, suggesting that they may be a useful alternative to commonly used compulsory voting schemes. ( JEL C92, D72, D02)
- Subjects
POLITICAL participation; COMPULSORY voting; VOTING abstention; VOTER turnout; BELGIAN politics &; government
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2016, Vol 54, Issue 4, p1963
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.12332