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- Title
The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint.
- Authors
Tiozzo, Marco
- Abstract
Some philosophers have defended the idea that in cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence it is rational to take divergent doxastic attitudes to p and E supports p. In a recent paper, Sophie Horowitz has argued that such "Level-Splitting views" are implausible since they violate a rational requirement she calls the Non-Akrasia Constraint. In this paper, I argue that Horowitz's objection is misguided since it conflates two distinct notions of epistemic rationality.
- Subjects
EPISTEMICS; SPLITTING (Psychology); AKRASIA; COHERENCE (Philosophy); GROUP identity
- Publication
Philosophia, 2019, Vol 47, Issue 3, p917
- ISSN
0048-3893
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11406-018-0014-6