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- Title
Arrow's Theorem with Weak Independence.
- Authors
Blau, Julian H.
- Abstract
The article focuses on economist K.J. Arrow's widely known theorem on social welfare functions. Some noted economists have suggested that the problem of social choice was incorrectly posed by Arrow; but he has argued cogently that his formulation of the social choice problem as the selection of a constitution is not only compatible with the views of such critics, but in fact is a logical corollary of their positive position. Thus the dispute concerns, not the idea of social welfare function, but rather the conditions to be imposed upon it. Of these, Arrow has removed monotonicity as an issue, by means of a technical advance in the second edition of his book "Social Choice and Individual Values," leaving the independence condition as the main target. Arrow's theorem, as revised in 1963, asserts that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is inconsistent with universal domain, non-dictatorship, and the principle that unanimity prevails. In Arrow's Theorem, one may greatly weaken the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and yet draw Arrow's conclusion.
- Subjects
ARROW, Kenneth Joseph, 1921-2017; PUBLIC welfare; SOCIAL choice; SOCIAL Choice &; Individual Values (Book); WELFARE economics; SOCIAL services
- Publication
Economica, 1971, Vol 38, Issue 152, p413
- ISSN
0013-0427
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/2551881