We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
A unifying impossibility theorem.
- Authors
Man, Priscilla; Takayama, Shino
- Abstract
This paper identifies and illuminates a common impossibility principle underlying a number of impossibility theorems in social choice. We consider social choice correspondences assigning a choice set to each non-empty subset of social alternatives. Three simple axioms are imposed as follows: unanimity, independence of preferences over infeasible alternatives, and choice consistency with respect to choices out of all possible alternatives. With more than three social alternatives and the universal preference domain, any social choice correspondence that satisfies our axioms is serially dictatorial. A number of known impossibility theorems-including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem, and the impossibility theorem under strategic candidacy-follow as corollaries.
- Subjects
IMPOSSIBILITY of performance; SOCIAL choice; AXIOMS; STRATEGIC planning; ECONOMIC impact; WELFARE economics
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2013, Vol 54, Issue 2, p249
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-013-0750-6