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- Title
An experimental examination into the design of decentralized methods to solve the assignment problem with and without money.
- Authors
Olson, Mark; Porter, David
- Abstract
An experimental examination of the assignment problem, matching individuals to positions or slots, is conducted in which various assignment mechanisms are analyzed. Generalized versions of both the Vickrey and English auctions are designed to solve the assignment problem along with original ranking mechanisms (serial dictator and "funny" money system). The generalized auctions result in efficient allocations. In contrast, the ordinal ranking mechanisms, which require no monetary transfers, are significantly less efficient in their assignments. However, the efficient allocations obtained from the competitive bidding processes are at the expense of consumers' surplus since demanders retain significantly larger profits with the ordinal ranking mechanisms.
- Subjects
ASSIGNMENTS (Law); AUCTIONS; MONEY; LETTING of contracts; RESOURCE allocation; CONSUMERS; EXPERIMENTAL design
- Publication
Economic Theory, 1994, Vol 4, Issue 1, p11
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF01211117