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- Title
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ADDING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS.
- Authors
Moremen, Philip M.
- Abstract
One way to increase the enforcement of international agreements may be to allow private parties to bring claims to enforce the rules of those agreements before an international forum. But, even if effective, when is private enforcement advantageous? This article seeks to provide a partial answer to this question by assessing, as a thought experiment, the effect of adding a private right of action (PRA) to two existing enforcement mechanisms: the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism and the Montreal Protocol Non-Compliance Procedure. The costs of adding PRAs to the WTO or to the Montreal Protocol would most likely outweigh the benefits, but for different reasons. In the case of the WTO, the most significant reason is that the WTO dispute resolution system is already comparatively legalized. The greater legalism, constraint, and rigidity provided by PRAs could render the system brittle, resulting in non-compliance and gradual defection. The Montreal Protocol system, on the other hand, relies on cooperative behavior and political pressure--an adversarial PRA could undermine the cooperative aspects of this approach.
- Subjects
DISPUTE resolution; INTERNATIONAL conflict; WORLD Trade Organization; INTERNATIONAL obligations; INTERNATIONAL relations
- Publication
UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, 2006, Vol 11, Issue 2, p189
- ISSN
1089-2605
- Publication type
Article