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- Title
Husserl on the Normativity of Intentionality and Its Neutralization.
- Authors
Huang, Di
- Abstract
In this paper, I explore Husserl's view on the normativity of intentionality and its neutralization. Husserl reaches his mature, normative-transcendental conception of intentionality by way of critical engagement with Brentano's position. As opposed to Brentano, Husserl does not conceive of the normativity of intentionality as deriving from the more basic character of polar opposition. Normativity comes first and it is an original, though not universal determination of intentionality which is expressed in the identificatory achievement of constitution. Even where it is absent, this absence makes itself felt since neutrality is never the simple omission of normativity but essentially its neutralizing modification. The discussion of neutrality-modification in Ideas I is, however, problematic, as I will argue by drawing upon Husserl's research manuscripts. I aim to show that neutralization is not a single but a group of closely related intentional modifications and that ways of neutralization are best conceptualized as changes of attitude. I will then examine phantasy and aesthetic consciousness as involving two such neutralizing attitudes. What they have in common is a spirit of playfulness in contrast to the serious commitment to truth that characterizes original intentionality. The neutralization of normativity takes place in play.
- Subjects
NORMATIVITY (Ethics); INTENTIONALITY (Philosophy); ATTITUDE change (Psychology); FANTASY (Psychology); CONSCIOUSNESS
- Publication
Husserl Studies, 2023, Vol 39, Issue 2, p121
- ISSN
0167-9848
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10743-022-09321-5