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- Title
"The Great Doctrine Disaster": Reform, Reaction, and Mechanization in the British Army, 1919-1939.
- Authors
Searle, Alaric
- Abstract
Historians have argued that Britain lost its early lead in developing mechanized formations in the interwar period due to financial pressures, interarm rivalry, poor tank design, and the misjudgments of tank enthusiasts. A systematic examination of armor doctrine, however, demonstrates that British approaches were coherent and innovative until 1935. Progress was derailed by the suppression of the "Tank Training" (1935) manual and the decision to mechanize the cavalry rather than expand the Royal Tank Corps. Coordination between manuals of arms of service and the field service regulations was abandoned, moreover, in favor of multiple training pamphlets. The result was the "Great Doctrine Disaster," which compounded false assumptions about tank design, tactics, and future war.
- Subjects
INTERWAR Period (1918-1939); BRITISH military history; TANKS (Military science); MILITARY tank design &; construction; GREAT Britain. Army; GREAT Britain. Army. Royal Tank Regiment
- Publication
Journal of Military History, 2023, Vol 87, Issue 3, p599
- ISSN
0899-3718
- Publication type
Article