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- Title
IN DEFENCE OF METAPHYSICAL ANALYTICITY.
- Authors
Hofmann, Frank; Horvath, Joachim
- Abstract
According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of ‘independence of (extralinguistic) facts’. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open. 1
- Subjects
METAPHYSICS; CONCEPTUALISM; TRUTHFULNESS &; falsehood; AMBIGUITY; CONDUCT of life; HUMAN acts (Ethics)
- Publication
Ratio, 2008, Vol 21, Issue 3, p300
- ISSN
0034-0006
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9329.2008.00403.x