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- Title
Physicalism, Nothing Buttery, and Supervenience.
- Authors
Hendel, Giovanna
- Abstract
I consider the position (which I call‘the triad’) according to which physicalism is a reductive claim which is capturable in terms of the idea (the ‘nothing buttery’ idea) that there is nothing but/nothing over and above the physical, an idea which, in its turn, is meant to be capturable in terms of a determinate form of supervenience. (Physicalism is then meant to be capturable in terms of the form of supervenience in question.) I argue that there is a tension in the triad. The notion of ‘nothing buttery’ required has features which can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad. Hence, one cannot have both physicalism as nothing-buttery-reductive and physicalism as supervenience of the kind in question. If one wants to hold onto the idea of physicalism as nothing-buttery-reductive, one must be prepared to identify physicalism with a much stronger claim than one might have originally thought, a claim that can't be captured by the supervenience of the triad.
- Subjects
LOGICAL positivism; SUPERVENIENCE (Philosophy)
- Publication
Ratio, 2001, Vol 14, Issue 3, p252
- ISSN
0034-0006
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/1467-9329.00161