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- Title
The Electoral Benefits of Distributive Spending.
- Authors
Lazarus, Jeffrey; Reilly, Shauna
- Abstract
Prior studies search for evidence that distributive spending influences Congress members' vote shares but find limited evidence. The authors argue that Democratic and Republican members each benefit from different types of distributive projects. Democrats benefit from delivering spending projects (what most people think of as "pork") to their constituents, while many Republican members benefit from delivering contingent liabilities (in which the federal treasury underwrites a private entity's financial risk). Empirical tests using data from U.S. House elections between 1984 and 2002 generally confirm these hypotheses, with one exception: only Republicans in relatively conservative districts gain from contingent liabilities. This result is further explored in the text.
- Subjects
UNITED States; CONTINGENT liabilities (Accounting); UNITED States. Congress. House; ELECTIONS &; economics; REPUBLICAN Party (U.S. : 1854- ) -- Finance; DEMOCRATIC Party (U.S.) -- Finance; ELECTIONS
- Publication
Political Research Quarterly, 2010, Vol 63, Issue 2, p343
- ISSN
1065-9129
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1177/1065912908329355