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- Title
Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem.
- Authors
Eriksson, Kimmo; Sjöstrand, Jonas; Strimling, Pontus
- Abstract
In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.
- Subjects
SECRETARY problem (Probability theory); GROUP decision making; DYNAMIC programming; OPTIMAL stopping (Mathematical statistics); GAMES of strategy (Mathematics); GAMES
- Publication
Operations Research, 2007, Vol 55, Issue 5, p921
- ISSN
0030-364X
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1287/opre.1070.0403