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- Title
A MATTER OF APPEARANCES: HOW CORPORATE LEADERS MANAGE THE IMPRESSIONS OF FINANCIAL ANALYSTS ABOUT THE CONDUCT OF THEIR BOARDS.
- Authors
WESTPHAL, JAMES D.; GRAEBNER, MELISSA E.
- Abstract
Our theory and findings suggest that relatively negative stock analyst appraisals prompt corporate leaders to increase externally visible dimensions of board independence without actually increasing board control of management. We also consider how relatively negative analyst appraisals may prompt impression management in CEO communications with analysts, whereby CEOs attest to their boards' tendency to monitor and control management on behalf of shareholders. We also find that increases in formal board independence, in combination with verbal impression management directed toward analysts, result in more favorable subsequent analyst appraisals of firms, despite a lack of effect on actual board control.
- Subjects
BOARDS of directors; CORPORATE image; CHIEF executive officers; IMPRESSION management; CORPORATE finance; CORPORATE governance
- Publication
Academy of Management Journal, 2010, Vol 53, Issue 1, p15
- ISSN
0001-4273
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5465/AMJ.2010.48036721