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- Title
Standing to Punish the Disadvantaged.
- Authors
Yost, Benjamin S.
- Abstract
Many philosophers and legal theorists worry about punishing the socially disadvantaged as severely as their advantaged counterparts. One philosophically popular explanation of this concern is couched in terms of moral standing: seriously unjust states are said to lack standing to condemn disadvantaged offenders. If this is the case, institutional condemnation of disadvantaged offenders (especially via hard treatment) will often be unjust. I describe two problems with canonical versions of this view. First, its proponents groundlessly claim that disadvantaged offenders may be punished as severely as advantaged ones, even though such punishment is unjust in light of the state's loss of standing. Second, and more importantly, moral standing arguments prohibit states from blaming advantaged as well as disadvantaged offenders. This unwelcome outcome suggests that standing approaches incorrectly analyze the source of moral misgivings about punishing the disadvantaged. I conclude that those who share such concerns should put standing accounts aside.
- Subjects
PHILOSOPHERS; SOCIAL marginality; PUNISHMENT; LEGAL ethics; JURISPRUDENCE
- Publication
Criminal Law & Philosophy, 2023, Vol 17, Issue 3, p711
- ISSN
1871-9791
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11572-022-09650-8