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- Title
Do we have (in)compatibilist intuitions? Surveying experimental research.
- Authors
Kiichi Inarimori; Souichiro Honma; Kengo Miyazono
- Abstract
This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals' compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions. It explores key insights from research studies that propose "natural compatibilism" and "natural incompatibilism". These studies reveal a complex landscape of folk intuitions, where participants appear to exhibit both types of intuitions. Here, we examine error theories, which purport to explain the coexistence of apparently contradictory intuitions: the Affective Performance Error hypothesis, the "Free Will No Matter What" hypothesis, the Bypassing hypothesis, and the Intrusion hypothesis, and the article explores the cognitive errors that could shape individuals' inconsistent perceptions of free will. We then explore three possibilities regarding folk intuitions: most individuals may hold either compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions, both simultaneously, or neither. Our aim is to deepen the understanding of the complex dynamics of intuitions about free will, and we close with suggestions for future studies in experimental philosophy.
- Subjects
INTUITION; FREE will &; determinism; EXPERIMENTAL philosophy; AUTONOMY (Philosophy); ERROR analysis in mathematics
- Publication
Frontiers in Psychology, 2024, p1
- ISSN
1664-1078
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1369399