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- Title
Intentionality and the Aristotelian -- Thomistic View of Concepts.
- Authors
Spalding, Thomas L.; Stedman, James; Hancock, Curtis; Gagné, Christina L.
- Abstract
In this paper we describe the problem of intentionality for modern theories of concepts and propose that taking an Aristotelian--Thomistic (A-T) approach to concepts helps to alleviate this problem. We begin by describing some recent problems within the psychological literature on concepts that might lead one to adopt an A-T approach to concepts (see Spalding and Gagné, 2013). We then discuss Quine's dilemma of intentionality and show how that dilemma plays out across a number of possible approaches to philosophy and psychology including psycho-functionalism, the current default philosophy of psychology. We then describe how the A-T approach to concepts deals with the problem of intentionality and suggest that it may provide a better way of thinking about intentionality than other modern approaches. We end by discussing some possible objections to the approach. We show that the A-T approach is, perhaps, surprisingly compatible with other recent work in psychology and that taking this approach to concepts and intentionality does not introduce Cartesian problems of dualism into modern psychology.
- Subjects
ACT psychology; PSYCHOLOGICAL research; THOMAS, Aquinas, Saint, ca. 1225-1274; FUNCTIONALISM (Psychology); CARTESIAN doubt
- Publication
Journal of Mind & Behavior, 2014, Vol 35, Issue 4, p245
- ISSN
0271-0137
- Publication type
Article