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- Title
Does Practicality Support Noncognitivism?
- Authors
Raskoff, Sarah Zoe
- Abstract
Normative judgments are practical: they bear a close connection to motivation. Noncognitivists often claim that they have a distinctive explanatory advantage accounting for this connection. After all, if normative judgments just are noncognitive, desire-like states, then it is no mystery why they bear an intimate connection to motivation: desire-like states motivate. In this paper, however, I argue that noncognitivism does not have this explanatory advantage after all. The problem is that noncognitivists cannot provide a characterization of the practicality of normative judgment that allows them to retain this advantage. Noncognitivists either posit a strong and controversial connection between normative judgment and motivation that cognitivists have no trouble rejecting, or they posit a weaker connection that cognitivists can explain just as well. Either way, noncognitivists cannot argue from the practicality of normative judgments to their claim that normative judgments are noncognitive, desire-like states. The practicality of normative judgments does not support noncognitivism.
- Subjects
EXPRESSIVISM (Ethics); COGNITIVE psychology; ACCOUNTING; MOTIVATION (Psychology); VALUES (Ethics)
- Publication
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2024, Vol 21, Issue 3/4, p249
- ISSN
1740-4681
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1163/17455243-20233916