We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Jury voting without objective probability.
- Authors
Li, King; Suzuki, Toru
- Abstract
Unlike in the standard jury voting experiment, the voting environment in practice has no explicit signal structure. Voters then need to conceptualize the information structure in order to update their beliefs based on 'pivotal reasoning'. This paper investigates whether voters can play a strategic voting under a 'detail-free' environment. We obtain non-parametric predictions in terms of the differences in voting behaviors under majority and unanimity rule. Our experimental results suggest that voters can still play the strategic voting as in the existing experiments.
- Subjects
JURY -- Social aspects; JURY instructions; SOCIAL choice; PARAMETRIC modeling; SOCIAL aspects of decision making
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2016, Vol 46, Issue 2, p389
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-015-0918-z