We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model.
- Authors
Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejdanro; Oviedo, Jorge
- Abstract
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quotaq-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never benefit by reporting untruthfully their preference relations. We exhibit an example showing that this property fails if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quotaq-separable.
- Subjects
GAME theory; MATHEMATICAL models; COMBINATORICS; MATCHING theory; MATHEMATICS; MARRIAGE theorem
- Publication
International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, Vol 33, Issue 1, p115
- ISSN
0020-7276
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s001820400189