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- Title
Phenomenal Conservatism and the Subject's Perspective Objection.
- Authors
Gage, Logan
- Abstract
For some years now, Michael Bergmann has urged a dilemma against internalist theories of epistemic justification. For reasons I explain below, some epistemologists have thought that Michael Huemer's principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) can split the horns of Bergmann's dilemma. Bergmann has recently argued, however, that PC must inevitably, like all other internalist views, fall prey to his dilemma. In this paper, I explain the nature of Bergmann's dilemma and his reasons for thinking that PC cannot escape it before arguing that he is mistaken: PC can indeed split its horns.
- Subjects
CONSERVATISM; SUBJECT (Philosophy); PERSPECTIVE (Philosophy); BERGMANN, Michael; HUEMER, Michael
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2016, Vol 31, Issue 1, p43
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-015-0262-z