We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Sustaining Cooperation in Trust Games.
- Authors
Rigdon, Mary L.; McCabe, Kevin A.; Smith, Vernon L.
- Abstract
It is well known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner's Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Without knowing it, players are typed based on their recent track record as to whether or not they are trusting (Players 1) and whether or not they are trustworthy (Players 2). They are then paired according to those types: trustors with trustworthy types, and similarly non-trustors with untrustworthy types. In the control comparisons, Players 1 are randomly repaired with Players 2 without regard to type. We ask: are there natural tendencies for people to cooperate more frequently in environments in which they experience more cooperation in comparison with controls?
- Subjects
PERSONALITY &; situation; FOCUSED interaction; TRUST; INTERPERSONAL relations; PRISONER'S dilemma game; GAME theory; COMPARATIVE studies; COOPERATIVENESS
- Publication
Economic Journal, 2007, Vol 117, Issue 522, p991
- ISSN
0013-0133
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02075.x