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- Title
Three-valued simple games.
- Authors
Musegaas, M.; Borm, P. E. M.; Quant, M.
- Abstract
In this paper we study three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. We analyze to which extent well-known results on the core and the Shapley value for simple games can be extended to this new setting. To describe the core of a three-valued simple game we introduce (primary and secondary) vital players, in analogy to veto players for simple games. Moreover, it is seen that the transfer property of Dubey (<xref>1975</xref>) can still be used to characterize the Shapley value for three-valued simple games. We illustrate three-valued simple games and the corresponding Shapley value in a parliamentary bicameral system.
- Subjects
VETO player theory; COOPERATIVE game theory; GAME theory; TERNARY logic; MATHEMATICAL models
- Publication
Theory & Decision, 2018, Vol 85, Issue 2, p201
- ISSN
0040-5833
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11238-017-9630-z