We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
'Externalities and Property Rights in the Fisheries': Comment.
- Authors
Loose, Verne W.; Robinson, Gary C.
- Abstract
This article comments on the paper by Richard Agnello and Lawrence Donnelley (A-D) about the externalities and property rights in oyster fisheries in the U.S. The model presented by A-D leans heavily on the conclusions of the traditional fisheries models first presented by Gordon and Scott in analyzing the effects of property rights structures on the allocation of productive factors. Briefly, the conclusion from the Scott-Gordon model is that the long-run industry equilibrium of a free entry, common property fishery will not coincide with the social optimum. The divergence of the private and social optima is caused by the uncollected payments to the marine resource which the private operators perceive as excess profits. This serves a signal for new entrants and possibly, for further investment by units already in the fishery. Entry and additional investment will continue until the stimulant, excess profits, approaches zero. The resulting equilibrium is characterized by an overinvestment of capital in terms of fleet size and capitalization of existing units. A-D presents a theoretical model which predicts that the average product of labor on the free-access beds is less than that on the privately held beds.
- Subjects
UNITED States; PROPERTY rights; EXTERNALITIES; OYSTER fisheries; PROFIT
- Publication
Land Economics, 1977, Vol 53, Issue 4, p488
- ISSN
0023-7639
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/3145992