We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
The Compellence Dilemma: International Disputes with Violent Groups.
- Authors
Carter, David B.
- Abstract
This article introduces the idea of a compellence dilemma. This dilemma arises when the domestic policies of adversaries-such as hosting violent groups-threaten states' security. Such states often consider coercive instruments to compel their adversary to change those policies. The problem? The prospect of costly punishment makes cooperation more attractive for the adversary. However, if they fail to coerce policy change, harsh punishments can reduce the adversary's capacity to enact policy change and induce harmful domestic instability. These problems are compounded by the fact that both the threatened states' incentive to use costly punishments and the costs of failed compellence increase with the severity of the security threat. The logic of the compellence dilemma applies whenever a state uses damaging coercive instruments but risks failing to achieve its immediate objectives. I analyze the compellence dilemma with a dynamic game-theoretic model of interaction among a target state, host state, and violent group, and show that it is pervasive in equilibrium. I show that the compellence dilemma causes states to refrain from using harsh punishments even when they would compel the host state to cooperate. Concerns about decreasing future host-state capacity and increasing group power drive this result.
- Subjects
INTERNATIONAL relations &; terrorism; STATE-sponsored terrorism; JAMAT al-Dawa Pakistan; INDIA-Pakistan relations; PUNISHMENT -- Social aspects; THREATS -- Social aspects; MILITARY relations; AGGRESSION (International law) -- Social aspects; POWER (Social sciences); TWENTY-first century; HISTORY
- Publication
International Studies Quarterly, 2015, Vol 59, Issue 3, p461
- ISSN
0020-8833
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/isqu.12192