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- Title
A NOTE ON RISK AVERSION IN A PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF BARGAINING.
- Authors
Roth, Alvin E.
- Abstract
The article considers the effect of risk aversion in an noncooperative model of multiperiod bargaining studied by Rubinstein. A variety of axiomatic models of single period bargaining have showed the qualitative effect of risk aversion within each bargaining period on the predicted outcome of bargaining in the strategic model of multi-period bargaining. The play of the game in the axiomatic models and in the strategic model considered by the paper involves no uncertainty and the bargainers have complete information. The link between the predictions of the axiomatic models and of the strategic model are discussed.
- Subjects
NEGOTIATION; RISK aversion; COLLECTIVE bargaining; RISK; UTILITY theory; ECONOMIC equilibrium; ECONOMETRIC models; ECONOMETRICS; MATHEMATICAL models
- Publication
Econometrica, 1985, Vol 53, Issue 1, p207
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/1911733