We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Some sceptical thought about metacognition.
- Authors
Brown, Derek
- Abstract
Metacognitive knowledge of one's own cognitive states is not as useful as is often thought. Differences between cognitive states often come down to differences in their intentional contents. For that reason, differences in behavior are often explained by differences just in contents of first-order states. Uncertainty need not be a metacognitive condition. First-order interpretations of the target experiments are available. Metacognitive states take lower-order cognitive states as their intentional objects. The contents of the lower-order states are embedded in the contents of the higher-order states.
- Subjects
METACOGNITION; BEHAVIOR; PSYCHOLOGY; SELF-perception; REASONING; SCIENTIFIC experimentation
- Publication
Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 2003, Vol 26, Issue 3, p340
- ISSN
0140-525X
- Publication type
Article