We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection.
- Authors
Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian
- Abstract
We study learning and selection and their implications for possible effort escalation in a simple game of dynamic property rights conflict: a multi-stage contest with random resolve. Accounting for the empirically well-documented heterogeneity of behavioral motives of players in such games turns the interaction into a dynamic game of incomplete information. In contrast to the standard benchmark with complete information, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium features social projection and type-dependent escalation of efforts caused by learning. A corresponding experimental setup provides evidence for type heterogeneity, for belief formation and updating, for self-selection and for escalation of efforts in later stages.
- Subjects
ESCALATION of commitment; GAME theory; PROPERTY rights; SOCIAL stability; CONTESTS; SOCIAL conflict; HETEROGENEITY
- Publication
Experimental Economics, 2020, Vol 23, Issue 3, p750
- ISSN
1386-4157
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10683-019-09630-1