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- Title
THE RATIONALITY OF RULE-FOLLOWING: HOBBES'S DISPUTE WITH THE FOOLE.
- Authors
Kavka, Gregory S.
- Abstract
This article restores Thomas Hobbe's rightfully deserved reputation as the winner of his dispute with the Foole, by showing how Jean Hampton's and David Gauthier's interpretation of Hobbe's reply to the Foole fail, and by providing a third interpretation of this reply that is accurate, plausible, and instructive. Also, this article provides a defensible individualist account of the rationality of following moral rules. After spelling out the lessons of this Hobbesian account of the rationality of rule-following, this article responds to the objections that the account is inferior to one that allows more frequent rule-violations, and that it is anachronistic. It concludes by discussing the relationship between individualist accounts of the rationality of rule-following, like Hobbes's, and collectivist accounts, like that offered by Conrad Johnson in his book Moral Legislation. The fool has claimed that not keeping covenants, was not against reason, when it conduced to ones benefit. In other words, once the other party to an agreement has complied, the first party will sometimes benefit more by breaking the agreement than by keeping it; when this is so it is rational (though unjust) to violate the agreement.
- Subjects
HOBBE, Thomas; HAMPTON, Jean; GAUTHIER, David; RULES; ETHICS; MORAL Legislation (Book); JOHNSON, Conrad
- Publication
Law & Philosophy, 1995, Vol 14, Issue 1, p5
- ISSN
0167-5249
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF01000523