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- Title
Political Budget Cycle, Tax Collection, and Yardstick Competition.
- Authors
Ferraresi, Massimiliano
- Abstract
This paper exploits the political cycle of Italian municipalities to test for the presence of strategic interactions in the collection of local taxation. The revenue from the personal income tax surcharge—a tax tool of low salience—is (positively) plagued by political manipulation and is found to be a strategic complement, but only when mayors run for re-election, a finding consistent with the yardstick competition hypothesis. More salient fiscal tools, such as property tax and user fees and charges, are also (negatively) affected by budget cycles, but they do not appear to be spatially correlated.
- Subjects
TAX collection; INCOME tax; LOCAL taxation; PROPERTY tax; SURCHARGES; USER charges
- Publication
B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2021, Vol 21, Issue 3, p1149
- ISSN
2194-6108
- Publication type
Letter
- DOI
10.1515/bejeap-2020-0380