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- Title
When is an alternative possibility robust?
- Authors
Kittle, Simon
- Abstract
According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based on the idea that what agents need to be able to do is keep open the possibility of securing their blamelessness, rather than needing to directly ensure their own blamelessness at the time of decision.
- Subjects
ROBUST statistics; RESPONSIBILITY; PEREBOOM, Derk; DECISION making; PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
European Journal of Philosophy, 2019, Vol 27, Issue 1, p199
- ISSN
0966-8373
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ejop.12369