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- Title
Wittgensteinovi argumenti za nemogućnost epistemičke privatnostic.
- Authors
PENAVA, Mate
- Abstract
Descartes’ philosophy marks a large turning point when talking about philosophical conceptions of the human mind. He points out that the mind of each individual is accessible only to himself and nobody else. This problem is often formulated like a question about existence about other minds outside my own mind, whose existence we can’t acknowledge with absolute certainty. A similar problem arises when we talk about the language in which we express our sensations, so it is said that, even though I can observe someone else’s pain, I can’t feel it, so it is private, accessible only to the person having it. Wittgenstein’s argumentation against any kind of privacy wil be exposed in the paper. Or as Wittgenstein says it, even if there can be such a thing as a private language, it can’t play any role in our language games, it can’t be a part of our form of life. Wittgenstein’s arguments will be presented from the perspective of some proponents of the traditional reading of his thought, like Anthony Kenny, David Stern or Peter Hacker. Interpretations put forth by authors like Fogelin, Kripke or Hintikka that construe Wittgenstein’s philosophy in a non-classical manner will not be considered.
- Publication
Acta Iadertina, 2023, Vol 20, Issue 2, p283
- ISSN
1845-3392
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.15291/ai.4390