We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
DISTINCTIONS WITH A DIFFERENCE: WHY PROPER RULE 59(E) MOTIONS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE" HABEAS ANALYSIS.
- Authors
MATINI, IMAD S.
- Abstract
Motions to reconsider--filed under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--are often considered one in the same, whether due to imprudent labeling by a litigant or due to the belief that little distinction exists between the two. In the context of habeas corpus petitions filed by pro se prisoners, motions under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) are often interchangeably filed. Within this context, however, the following issue persists: whether a motion filed under either rule is subject to the "second or successive" restriction under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The Supreme Court of the United States partially resolved this issue in Gonzalez v. Crosby. There, the Court held that a motion filed under Rule 60(b) that advances a claim is subject to the second or successive limitation under the AEDPA. Despite the Court's holding in Crosby, debate persists over whether the second or successive limitation under AEDPA should be extended to motions filed under Rule 59(e). Indeed, a circuit split has developed over this issue. Some courts argue that a timely Rule 59(e) motion is a second or successive petition if it advances a "claim," as analyzed under Crosby, while others believe this motion is not a second or successive petition, whether or not it advances a claim. Proponents of the latter belief have argued that Crosby should not be extended to motions under Rule 59(e) when that motion is filed during a litigant's initial habeas petition. Why? Because that motion arguably relates to a petitioner's one complete opportunity to seek collateral relief, as provided under the AEDPA. This Article echoes this argument, asserting that Crosby should not apply to motions under Rule 59(e), whether they advance a claim or not, because such motions are part and parcel of a party's one, entitled-to-attempt at pursuing habeas relief under the AEDPA.
- Subjects
UNITED States; CIVIL procedure; HABEAS corpus; LEGAL self-representation; LEGAL status of prisoners; LEGAL motions; ANTITERRORISM &; Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (U.S.); ACTIONS &; defenses (Law)
- Publication
Tennessee Law Review, 2016, Vol 84, Issue 1, p59
- ISSN
0040-3288
- Publication type
Article