We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Is there a self-enforcing monetary constitution?
- Authors
Salter, Alexander
- Abstract
A self- enforcing monetary constitution has rules that agents acting within the system will uphold even in the presence of deviations from ideal knowledge and complete benevolence. It thus does not require external enforcement. What would such a constitution look like? I show that two regimes-a version of nominal gross domestic product targeting that relies on market implementation of monetary policy, and free banking-meet these requirements for self-enforcing monetary constitutions. The analysis draws insights from political economy, and from constitutional political economy in particular.
- Subjects
MONETARY policy; BENEVOLENCE; GROSS domestic product; FREE banking; CENTRAL banking industry; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Constitutional Political Economy, 2014, Vol 25, Issue 3, p280
- ISSN
1043-4062
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10602-014-9163-1