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- Title
An experimental analysis of strikes in bargaining games with one-sided private information.
- Authors
Forsythe, Robert; Kennan, John; Sopher, Barry
- Abstract
We study two-player pie-splitting games in which one player knows the pie and the other knows only its probability distribution. We compare treatments in which incentive-efficient strikes (disagreements) are possible with alternatives in which efficiency forbids strikes. We find that incentive-efficiency is very helpful in explaining when strikes occur. There is also evidence of substantial heterogeneity in the subjects' altruism and in their risk preferences. This means that the common-knowledge assumptions of game theory cannot be controlled in experiments; but in our experiments the main theoretical conclusions seem robust to violations of these assumptions.
- Subjects
ECONOMICS; LABOR disputes; COLLECTIVE bargaining; STRIKES &; lockouts; DISTRIBUTION (Probability theory); GAME theory; MATHEMATICAL models
- Publication
American Economic Review, 1991, Vol 81, Issue 1, p253
- ISSN
0002-8282
- Publication type
Article