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- Title
Self-reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal Teams.
- Authors
Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus
- Abstract
We extend the analysis of self-reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non-cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self-reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self-report. The same result occurs for imperfect self-reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice.
- Subjects
LAW enforcement; EXTERNALITIES; WELFARE economics; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Economica, 2004, Vol 71, Issue 283, p333
- ISSN
0013-0427
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00374.x