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- Title
Editorial introduction to the special issue on 'Strategic Queueing: Game-Theoretic Models in Queueing Theory'—part 2.
- Authors
Economou, Antonis; Kulkarni, Vidyadhar
- Abstract
The authors use a matrix-analytic approach to determine the equilibrium strategies of the customers in two cases, according to whether reneging is permitted or not. I Mark Fackrell, Peter Taylor and Jiesen Wang i consider an M/M/1 feedback queue, where each customer, after being served, departs with probability I q i or joins the end of the queue to wait to be served again. I Liron Ravner and Yutaka Sakuma i consider a Poisson population of customers who strategically choose their arrival times to a single-server queue with opening and closing times, with the objective of minimizing their expected waiting times.
- Subjects
MODEL theory; QUEUING theory; NASH equilibrium; POISSON processes; GAME theory; PSYCHOLOGICAL feedback
- Publication
Queueing Systems, 2021, Vol 97, Issue 3/4, p221
- ISSN
0257-0130
- Publication type
Editorial
- DOI
10.1007/s11134-021-09699-7