We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory.
- Authors
Kuzmics, Christoph; Rodenburger, Daniel
- Abstract
We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe et al. (Soc Choice Welf 10:223–247, 1993). In every one of 24 rounds, 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14-player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.
- Subjects
EQUILIBRIUM; PUBLIC opinion polls; NULL hypothesis; RISK aversion; LABORATORIES
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2020, Vol 70, Issue 3, p685
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-019-01224-5