We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Blocking Kripke's Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind.
- Authors
Gozzano, Simone
- Abstract
In this paper, I present a two-pronged argument devoted to defending the type-identity theory of mind against the argument presented by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. In the first part, the interpersonal case, I show that since it is not possible to establish the metaphysical conditions for phenomenal identity, it is not possible to argue that there can be physical differences between two subjects despite their phenomenal identity. In the second part, the intrapersonal case, I consider the possibility of imagining one and the same individual having the same phenomenal state while counterfactually being in very different physical states. I argue that this case should respect Kripke's implicit theory of personal identity—but this proves to be a very difficult task to accomplish, thus preventing the argument from getting off the ground. Therefore, I maintain, that the type-identity theory is still the better option to solve the mind–body problem.
- Subjects
THEORY of mind; SELF; ARGUMENT; PHENOMENALISM; PROBLEM solving
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2023, Vol 38, Issue 3, p371
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-022-00525-0