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- Title
Checking and the Argument from Inquiry.
- Authors
Siscoe, Robert Weston
- Abstract
Even if I already know that I p i , I might want to confirm that I p i , verify that I p i , double check that I p i , make sure that I p i , or corroborate that I p i .[17] Falbo ([4]) and Woodard (2022) make the case that inquiry aims, not just at knowledge, but at epistemic improvement more generally. After all, if further inquiry and knowledge are perfectly consistent, then an activity like checking that I p i might also be compatible with knowing that I p i , leaving us once again without an explanation for why those who check whether I p i might think that they do not know that I p i . Friedman (2017), (2019a), and (2019b) discusses both (III) and (IV), holding that inquiring whether I p i requires suspending on I p i and that believing I p i and simultaneously suspending on I p i is irrational. In his recent book, I Knowing and Checking i , Guido Melchior sets out to explain a number of puzzles about knowledge via an analysis of checking.
- Subjects
ARGUMENT; SOCIAL epistemology; INTUITION; TRASH bags; CONFLICT of interests
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2023, Vol 38, Issue 1, p69
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-022-00532-1