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- Title
Unknowable Colour Facts.
- Authors
Cutter, Brian
- Abstract
It is common for an object to present different colour appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: one experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, according to which inegalitarianism should be rejected because it is committed to the existence of unknowable colour facts (for example, facts about which objects are unique green). The goal of this paper is to show that ecumenists are also committed to unknowable colour facts. More specifically, I argue that, with the exception of colour eliminativism, all major philosophical theories of colour are committed to unknowable colour facts.
- Subjects
APPEARANCE (Philosophy); ILLUSION (Philosophy); NIHILISM (Philosophy); EXISTENTIALISM; CHRISTIAN union
- Publication
Mind, 2021, Vol 130, Issue 519, p909
- ISSN
0026-4423
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/mind/fzaa058