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- Title
Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland.
- Authors
Tennant, Neil
- Abstract
Responds to Jeffrey Ketland's reactions to criticisms concerning the incompatibility of the deflationary conception of truth with the Godelian incompleteness phenomena in mathematics. Claim of Ketland and other writers that deflationism about truth could be discredited by consideration of the special status of independent Godel sentence; Attempt to demonstrate that a certain argument appealing to the orthodox treatment of Godel sentences in arithmetic did not count against deflationism about truth; Semantical argument.
- Subjects
DEFLATIONARY theory of truth; INCOMPLETENESS theorems; PHILOSOPHY; KETLAND, Jeffrey; SEMANTICS; PROOF theory; CONSTRUCTIVE mathematics
- Publication
Mind, 2005, Vol 114, Issue 453, p89
- ISSN
0026-4423
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/mind/fzi089