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- Title
Our epistemic dependence on others: Nyāya and Buddhist accounts of testimony as a source of knowledge.
- Authors
Picascia, Rosanna
- Abstract
This paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker's say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker's statements, an epistemic agent must possess non-testimonial evidence for the reliability of the testimony in question. This disagreement regarding the division of epistemic labour in testimonial exchanges demonstrates how differently Nyāya and Buddhist philosophers view the prevalence and practical importance of testimonial knowledge. For Nyāya, the ubiquity and easy acquisition of testimonial knowledge help explain the success of our daily actions. However, for Buddhist epistemologists, despite the regularity with which we successfully act based on what others tell us, testimonial knowledge is, in fact, less common, and more difficult to acquire, than we might think.
- Subjects
BUDDHISTS; DIVISION of labor; BUDDHIST philosophy
- Publication
Journal of Hindu Studies, 2024, Vol 17, Issue 1, p62
- ISSN
1756-4255
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/jhs/hiad003