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- Title
MOORE'S PARADOX AND THE LOGIC OF BELIEF.
- Authors
PÁEZ, ANDRÉS
- Abstract
Moore's Paradox is a test case for any formal theory of belief. In Knowledge and Belief, Hintikka developed a multimodal logic for statements that express sentences containing the epistemic notions of knowledge and belief. His account purports to offer an explanation of the paradox. In this paper I argue that Hintikka's interpretation of one of the doxastic operators is philosophically problematic and leads to an unnecessarily strong logical system. I offer a weaker alternative that captures in a more accurate way our logical intuitions about the notion of belief without sacrificing the possibility of providing an explanation for problematic cases such as Moore's Paradox.
- Subjects
ASSERTIONS (Logic); PARADOX; LOGIC; EPISTEMIC logic; INTUITION; POSSIBILITY
- Publication
Manuscrito, 2020, Vol 43, Issue 2, p1
- ISSN
0100-6045
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1590/0100-6045.2020.V43N2.AP