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- Title
Minimal disturbance: in defence of pragmatic reasons of the right kind.
- Authors
Bastian, Lisa
- Abstract
This paper draws attention to an important methodological shortcoming in debates about what counts as a reason for belief. An extremely influential distinction in this literature is between reasons of the 'right kind' and the 'wrong kind'. However, as I will demonstrate, arguments making use of this distinction often rely on a specific (and not explicitly stated) conception of epistemic rationality. Shifting focus to a reasonable alternative, namely a coherentist conception, can lead to surprising consequences—in particular, pragmatic reasons can, against orthodoxy, indeed be reasons of the right kind for belief.
- Subjects
REASON; BELIEF &; doubt; EPISTEMIC logic; COHERENCE (Philosophy); RIGHT &; wrong; PRAGMATISM
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2020, Vol 177, Issue 12, p3615
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-019-01385-y