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- Title
Limits of Abductivism About Logic.
- Abstract
I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abduction.
- Subjects
LOGIC; ABDUCTION (Logic); PHILOSOPHY; REASONING; INTELLECT
- Publication
Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 2021, Vol 103, Issue 2, p320
- ISSN
0031-8205
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/phpr.12707