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- Title
Does Kripke’s Argument Against Functionalism Undermine the Standard View of What Computers Are?
- Authors
Buechner, Jeff
- Abstract
Kripke’s argument against functionalism extended to physical computers poses a deep philosophical problem (not previously addressed in the literature) for understanding the standard view of what computers are. The problem puts into jeopardy the definition in the standard view that computers are physical machines for performing physical computations. Indeed, it is entirely possible that, unless this philosophical problem is resolved, we will never have a good understanding of computers and may never know just what they are.
- Subjects
FUNCTIONALISM (Social sciences); COMPUTER science; UNDERDETERMINATION (Theory of knowledge); SKEPTICISM; PHILOSOPHICAL research
- Publication
Minds & Machines, 2018, Vol 28, Issue 3, p491
- ISSN
0924-6495
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11023-018-9466-5