We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects.
- Authors
Ray, Debraj; Baland, Jean-Marie; Dagnelie, Olivier
- Abstract
A group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. For higher elasticities of substitution, perfect equality is no longer unimprovable. Our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action.
- Subjects
COLLECTIVE action; JOINT ventures; IMPERFECT competition; INDUSTRIAL efficiency; EMPLOYEE reviews; PRODUCTIVITY accounting; LABOR productivity
- Publication
Economic Journal, 2007, Vol 117, Issue 522, p922
- ISSN
0013-0133
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02064.x